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TIME AND CHANGE IN JUDGE-MADE LAW:
CONVERGENCE, DIVISIONS OF
AUTHORITY, AND THE
RESTATEMENT
Michael L. Wells*

INTRODUCTION
In his contribution to Wake Forest Law School’s 2009
Symposium on the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Professor Kenneth
Abraham starts with two propositions, one descriptive, the other
normative. The descriptive claim is that “tort law . . . is mature and
1
largely stable,” and that “[o]ver time, the law of different states
2
will converge.” As he points out, “The formation of the American
Law Institute (“ALI”) itself, and the project of restating the law that
3
the ALI . . . undertook” depends on these premises.
The project of restating the law also depends on a normative
premise, namely that “mov[ing] that process along” is a worthy
4
goal. The idea that the private law should be the same in all fifty
states certainly seems preferable to anyone who has coped with the
difficulties of working with variations among states on issues of tort
law. Convergence not only avoids arbitrary differences in the way
similarly situated litigants are treated, but also offers a solution to
the many practical difficulties that arise when a given transaction
crosses state lines. In any event, adherence to this norm may be a
matter of existential necessity for the ALI. Otherwise, one is hard
put to justify the resources that are expended in producing the
Restatements. The descriptive and normative claims are related in
that the value of moving the process along is greater or lesser
depending on how successful the project is likely to be.
Whether Professor Abraham subscribes to these propositions is
not entirely clear from his article. Since his project was to identify
“stable divisions of authority” within the tort system, the premise of
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unity serves merely to highlight those divisions. My aim here is not
to find fault with anything in his article, but rather to examine the
notion that tort law does and should move toward unity. For
convenience, I will call these descriptive and normative claims the
“convergence thesis.”
Professor Abraham’s article addresses a problem for the
descriptive side of this thesis. He acknowledges that “[t]here
are . . . areas of doctrine over which the states have what seems to
6
be permanent or at least long-term disagreement.” For the most
part, he argues, these areas can be pigeonholed into three
categories: “(1) developmental dead ends, (2) fundamental clashes of
7
values, and (3) concerns about consistency of administration.” If I
understand Professor Abraham correctly, his point is that areas of
disagreement do not necessarily pose a challenge to the general
tendency toward convergence. But Abraham seems to assure us
that the divisions are discrete, limited, and themselves “stable.” His
point is well taken, for no general description of a system as large
and complex as American private law can hope to account for its
every feature. Nonetheless, in this Article, I will raise questions
about both the descriptive and normative claims of the convergence
thesis.
I. TRANSFORMATIONS IN TORT LAW
As a description of tort doctrine, the notion that there is a basic
unity across the states—except for a few stable divisions of
authority on matters like market-share liability and the treatment
of trespassers—seems to me to be correct over the very short term.
Over longer periods of time, however, tort law is more dynamic than
Professor Abraham’s description suggests. Rather than being
“stable divisions of authority,” large areas of tort law are
transformed, sometimes in subtle ways, and sometimes radically.
Compare, for example, the contents of the second edition of the
8
Gregory and Kalven casebook, published in 1969, with the ninth
edition of the book, now edited by Richard Epstein and published in
9
2008. Gregory and Kalven begin their casebook with causation, and
the book contains no materials at all on either market-share liability
or “increased risk,” theories of causation that have taken hold in
10
some courts in the interim. The 1969 edition of the Gregory and
Kalven casebook was published a few years after the Restatement
11
(Second) of Torts first addressed products liability in 1965. Most of
the cases deal with privity, the warranty-tort distinction, and the
economic loss rule that obliges some litigants to sue in contract

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 964.
Id.
Id.
CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS
TORTS (2d ed. 1969).
9. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (9th ed. 2008).
10. See GREGORY & KALVEN, supra note 8, at 5–20.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 391 (1965).
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rather than tort. Current casebooks contain extensive treatments
of design defect, the duty to warn, the plaintiff’s conduct, federal
13
preemption, and other matters. These do not appear in the earlier
edition of the book for the very good reason that none of these cases
had been decided. On the treatment of trespassers, the earlier book
notes the “recent California case, Rowland v. Christian” for the
proposition that the older rule “may now be in the process of
14
change.” The more recent edition includes Rowland as a main case
and surveys the mixed reception the case received in the intervening
15
four decades. The Gregory and Kalven casebook includes a long
chapter entitled “Ultimate Policy Issues” devoted mainly to no-fault
schemes that would replace or supplement tort remedies with first16
party insurance. This idea was fashionable at the time, and New
17
But no-fault
Zealand actually adopted such a scheme in 1972.
schemes fell out of favor in the forty years between the publication
of the two books. Epstein’s chapter on policy focuses on specific
insurance schemes, primarily workers’ compensation and no-fault
18
car insurance. The “tort reform” movement, which has generally
involved state-by-state legislation, has produced another set of
19
variations among jurisdictions.
One could go on, but these examples will suffice for my
purposes. Indeed, noting the changes in tort law over the past forty
years may seem not only to belabor the obvious, but also to miss
Abraham’s point. The ALI pays close attention to changes over
time.
Those changes are the main reason for drafting the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in the 1960s, and a third one today.
Defenders of the convergence thesis would no doubt charge that by
noting changes in the law over time I have mixed apples and
oranges. It is clear that Professor Abraham means to refer to
convergence at a given point in time and does not mean to deny that
tort law changes significantly over time. Given the extent of change
over time, Abraham must mean to assert that change over time is
different from, and compatible with, convergence at any given point
in time.
But the distinction between change over time and variation at a
given point in time is not as sharp as defenders of convergence may
imagine it to be. One reason is that in a system of private law that
includes over fifty jurisdictions, each of them is sovereign over the

12. See GREGORY & KALVEN, supra note 8, at 584–631.
13. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 723–852.
14. GREGORY & KALVEN, supra note 8, at 404 (discussing Rowland v.
Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)).
15. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 593–606.
16. GREGORY & KALVEN, supra note 8, at 782–910.
17. For a description and critique of the plan, see generally James A.
Henderson, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 781 (1981).
18. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 961–1012. The New Zealand plan
receives just six pages at the end of the chapter. See id. at 1012–18.
19. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 419–20 (discussing statutory
modifications of joint and several liability).
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matters of general tort law covered by the various Restatements.
In matters of common law, change comes to each state at a different
pace. Change over time begins with one jurisdiction deciding to
break with precedent, as the California Supreme Court did in
Rowland with respect to landowner liability. But other jurisdictions
do not then consider the issue simultaneously or even in the same
legislative session, and then either adopt it or not. Rather, changes
over time occur at an uneven pace from one jurisdiction to another.
Their courts take up the issue periodically over the ensuing decades,
depending on whether and when an appropriate case raises it. Even
if the issue is one as to which the law ultimately does “work[] itself
21
pure” —as landowner liability does not—most of the time the law
will differ from one place to another.
In addition, judicial opinions can be unclear on whether any
change has taken place on a given matter and the substance of
whatever change that may have occurred. Consider the design22
In one view, the Georgia
defect issue discussed by Abraham.
Supreme Court has endorsed the “reasonable alternative design”
23
test of the Restatement (Third) on products liability. But the case
also says that “[u]nder Georgia law, the proper analysis in a design
defect case is to balance the risks inherent in a product design
24
against the utility of the product so designed,” and refers to the
court’s previous “adoption of the risk-utility analysis” in its leading
25
A prudent lawyer would conclude that
decision on the topic.
exactly what Georgia has done remains an open question, though it
surely has rejected the “consumer expectations” test that Abraham
26
discusses.
If all of the “changes in tort doctrine over time” had already
been set in motion by, say, August 1, 2010, the process of change as
it moves from one jurisdiction to another would be a temporary
problem for the convergence thesis. But no one would endorse that
premise, as it is wholly unrealistic to suppose that the political,
social, technological, and cultural factors that produce changes in
the common law have now come to an end. Perhaps Professor
Abraham means to predict that the only political, social,
technological, and cultural changes that will affect tort law going
forward are discrete ones that will lead to more examples of the
narrow and “stable divisions of authority” that he identifies.
Lacking a crystal ball, I cannot disprove that prediction, but I would
suggest that it is ahistorical and implausible. Someone making a
20. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
21. Abraham, supra note 1, at 963 (quoting Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26
Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.) 23).
22. Id. at 967–70.
23. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 185 (6th ed. 2008) (citing Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc.,
274 Ga. 115, 118 (2001), for the proposition that under Georgia risk-utility
standards “the ‘heart’ of a design defect case is the reasonableness of selecting
from among alternative product designs and adopting the safest feasible one”).
24. Jones v. Nordictrack, Inc., 550 S.E.2d 101, 102 (Ga. 2001).
25. Id. at 103 (citing Banks v. ICI Ams., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994)).
26. Abraham, supra note 1, at 969–70.
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similar prediction about products liability in 1970 would have been
proven wrong by the exponential growth of products law that began
in that decade. Nor did anyone foresee the growth of mass tort
27
litigation and the doctrinal innovations it would spawn.
Developments of similar scope surely await us, and with them will
come less convergence, followed by sporadic, uncertain, and
incomplete moves toward unity, followed by more innovations and
renewed disparity. The ALI will continue to struggle to keep up.
II. THE BENEFITS OF CONVERGENCE IN TORT LAW
The descriptive question raised by the plausible “at a given
moment in time” version of the convergence thesis is not binary, but
rather a matter of degree—not whether there is convergence at a
given moment in time, but how much convergence we have attained.
Answering this question is not just a matter of counting up doctrines
and splits of authority. It necessarily has a qualitative aspect: one
must ask whether the areas in which courts disagree are especially
significant or not. Reasonable people can differ about the answer.
The more interesting question for me is the normative one:
should we make an effort to achieve greater convergence, through
Restatements and other means? The first point that needs to be
made about this question is that our system of private law is not a
unitary one in which the Supreme Court of the United States
exercises final authority over all tort law. In such a system, the case
for promoting convergence would be compelling. Allowing variations
within a system to persist indefinitely would be intolerable, as
persons governed by the same set of legal rules would be treated
differently. At the time of the first Restatement of Torts in the
28
1930s, it was possible to conceive of our system in this way, or to
imagine it moving in this direction, for the federal courts were free,
29
under Swift v. Tyson, to follow common law rules of their own
choosing. But “the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not
30
accrue,” and the Court eventually overruled Swift in Erie R.R. Co.
31
v. Tompkins. Rather than opting for a unitary body of private law,
Erie signaled that our federal system treats the great bulk of private
32
law, including torts, as state law. Erie not only put to rest Swift’s
futile dream of a nationally uniform common law but also declared
33
that “there is no federal general common law.”
After Erie, arguments for and against convergence boil down to
the costs and benefits of variety versus unity in the common law.
27. Many of these innovations are examined in RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE
LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2009).
28. See 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1939); 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1938); 2
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE (1934); 1 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS:
INTENTIONAL HARMS TO PERSONS, LANDS, AND CHATTELS (1934).
29. 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
30. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
31. Id. at 79–80.
32. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 504–05 (1954).
33. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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Variations among states certainly add a layer of complexity and
uncertainty to business planning and to litigation that crosses state
lines, as issues may arise as to which state’s law applies to a given
issue. A whole body of law on “conflicts of law,” itself important
enough to warrant a law school course on the topic, addresses those
issues. Litigants who seem to be similarly situated may be treated
34
differently on account of the operation of conflicts principles.
Convergence would lessen the incidence of that kind of unfairness.
A quite distinct argument for convergence concentrates on the
quality of the rules themselves. It is plausible to believe that a
centralized decision maker, like the ALI, will construct better rules
than a myriad of state courts. The ALI has access to all of the
decisions of all of the state courts, as well as the expertise of leading
judges, lawyers, and academics. The Reporters and Advisory
Committees can take their time and are obliged to shed their
partisan concerns. Under these conditions, issues can be addressed
deliberately, disinterestedly, and free from the distractions of
35
litigation. The aim of improving the law through Restatements can
only be achieved to the extent courts everywhere endorse
convergence and follow the Restatement formulation of the doctrine.
Consider, for example, Professor Abraham’s discussion of the diverse
36
One
views among states concerning trespasser liability.
implication of the “superior rule maker” argument for convergence is
that the forty-one states that have rejected the Restatement
(Second)’s rule on trespassers should change their law, just because
a superior decision maker has made a different choice. As for
Professor Abraham, his discussion of the topic carefully avoids
taking sides.
On the other hand, an array of arguments can be marshaled on
the opposing side:
• One is entitled to doubt the superior wisdom of the ALI
34. For example, suppose that a North Carolina resident and a Georgia
resident are both driving while texting and collide on a roadway somewhere.
Each sues the other for negligence and each raises a contributory negligence
defense. Both are found negligent as defendants and contributorily negligent as
plaintiffs. Assume that under the conflicts rule of the jurisdiction where the
suits are brought the plaintiff’s fault is governed by his residency. The result is
that the Georgian will have his recovery reduced under Georgia’s comparative
negligence rule, while the North Carolinian will recover nothing under North
Carolina’s absolute defense. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33(a) (2010) (“Where an
action is brought against one or more persons for injury to person or property
and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the injury or damages
claimed, the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages to
be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff and
the judge shall reduce the amount of damages otherwise awarded to the
plaintiff in proportion to his or her percentage of fault.”); Sorrells v. M.Y.B.
Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, 332 N.C. 645, 648, 423 S.E.2d 72, 73–74
(1992) (holding that a finding of contributory negligence bars recovery from a
defendant for acts of ordinary negligence).
35. See Catharine Pierce Wells, A Pragmatic Approach to Improving Tort
Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2001) (describing the aspirations of the ALI
as it undertook the process of restating the law).
36. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 967–68.
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Reporters and Advisory Committees. Some have charged that
the drafting of modern Restatements may place an
“extraordinary burden” on the participants “of reconciling the
37
demands of law and politics.”
• Even if political compromises can be avoided, it is
reasonable to think that calm and detachment are not
necessarily virtues. Better rules may be made in the heat of
conflict, under pressure to reach conclusions that have
significant impact on real litigants.
• Variations among jurisdictions permit us to test the impact
of one rule compared to another over time and better evaluate
its quality.
• In a big country, the social and cultural underpinnings of
tort law may differ from one place to another. The nonflagrant
trespasser may be viewed as a more serious problem in a rural
state than an urban one, such that a “no recovery” rule is
appropriate in the former while the Restatement (Third)’s
formulation is appropriate for the latter.
• The federal structure of our system of government reflects a
preference for localized over centralized decision making on
matters that neither the Constitution nor Congress have
addressed. The point of Erie was not merely to do away with
Swift. Granting that there is a case for convergence, Erie
reflects the value that our federal system places on the
benefits of variety over those of unity.
• In a centralized system, one cannot easily avoid a rule one
finds repugnant. When the issue is governed by state law, one
can move away.

For my part, this latter set of arguments carries the day. While
the case for convergence has merit, I distrust the general notion that
centralized rule making works better than law making dispersed
over a large and culturally diverse nation like the United States.
With regards to tort law in particular, it is, as it was eighty years
38
ago, “one of the most dynamic fields of government.” It seems to
me unwise to aim for convergence in such an area, even if that aim
could be achieved.

37. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 635 (1995).
38. Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REV. 582, 585 (1935).

